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PREFACE
This report presents research indings of “Closing the Employment Standards Enforcement Gap,” a multiyear project supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Although
it covers many of the themes addressed in the inal report of Ontario’s Changing Workplace Review
(CWR), released on May 23, 2017, to which the Ontario government responded with proposed legislative
amendments on May 30, 2017, the research informing this report was conducted over several years prior
to the initiation of the CWR. “Closing the Employment Standards Enforcement Gap” is also slated to
continue after any legislation currently under consideration is enacted.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Why Employment Standards Matter
Precarious employment is increasing in Ontario. A growing share of Ontario’s private sector employees
earns low wages while a shrinking portion belongs to unions. These trends are fueled by changes in
the structure of Ontario’s labour force. In many industries, including accommodation and food services,
administrative services, and cleaning, workplaces are being transformed through greater use of
contracting out, franchising, and extended supply chains.1 These ways of structuring work contribute to
driving working conditions downward.
The Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA), which sets minimum conditions of employment in areas
such as wages, working time, and vacations and leaves, is a key source of workplace protection for
a growing number of employees in the province. But its outdated provisions, spotty coverage, and
inadequate enforcement leave too many people poorly protected at work. The ESA’s scope of coverage
is out of sync with the changing nature and organization of employment in the province. Its patchwork
of exemptions and special rules mean that many employees fall between cracks in its protection. In
addition, as the Government of Ontario recognizes, “…there is a serious problem with enforcement of ESA
provisions... there are too many people in too many workplaces who do not receive their basic rights.”2
The ESA’s enforcement tends to rely primarily on a reactive complaints process that many employees
are afraid to access. And too often even those employees who successfully access the system do not
experience a timely and efective resolution of their complaints. The low rate of recovery of unpaid
wages, and limited use of meaningful penalties for employers who violate the ESA, mean that there
is limited incentive to comply with law. Without better understanding the factors that undermine the
provision of employment standards in Ontario, eforts to maintain an efective loor of protections will
continue to be compromised.
This report sets out a vision for strengthening the enforcement of the ESA. It advances
recommendations for updating the provisions and enforcement of the Act so that it better protects
people in precarious jobs. The report draws on research indings of “Closing the Employment Standards
Enforcement Gap,” a multi-year research partnership supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, and involving researchers from eight universities, an international advisory
team of academic experts drawn from Australia, the United States, and Europe, as well as workers’
advocates from across Ontario.3 The research project adopts a mixed-method approach, incorporating
archival data, interviews with workers and with staf of the Ministry of Labour, and analyses of Statistics
Canada data and administrative data relating to the enforcement of the ESA.4 This report draws
exclusively on interviews with workers5 and analyses of Statistics Canada data and administrative data
relating to the enforcement of the ESA.
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2. How Has Employment in Ontario Changed?
Developing appropriate, efective, and enforceable employment standards requires a sound
understanding of the contours of precarious employment in Ontario, and the workplace practices that
fuel its associated insecurities. Framing the sections that follow, this section provides a brief overview
of major labour force trends that shape precarious employment, deined here as work for remuneration
characterized by uncertainty (i.e., surrounding continuing employment), low income (e.g., low wages),
and limited statutory entitlements as well as social beneits (i.e., constrained access to regulatory
protection). Imbued with unequal power relations, precarious employment is shaped by the relationship
between employment status (i.e., self or paid employment), form of employment (i.e., temporary or
permanent, part-time or full-time), social location (or the interaction between social relations, such
as gender and race, and legal and political categories, such as citizenship), as well as social context
(occupation, industry, and geography).

A. Forms of Employment Identiied with Precariousness
While precarious employment and “non-standard” forms of employment are not – and need not be –
synonymous, there is a relationship between them because historically labour laws, such as the ESA and
the Labour Relations Act (LRA), have taken the standard employment relationship, deined as a full-time
permanent employment relationship where the worker has one employer, works on the employer’s
premises, and has access to statutory entitlements and beneits, to be the norm. For this reason, forms
of employment difering from this model have come to be linked with greater precariousness. For
example, part-time employment may not provide workers with income suicient to maintain themselves
and dependents. Temporary employment is, by deinition, uncertain. And a central characteristic of most
self-employment is the absence of labour protections.

Graph 1: Part-Time Employees, Ontario6
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Graph 2: Non-Permanent Employees, Ontario7
20%

15%

10%

5%

Public Sector

2016-

2015-

2014-

2013-

2012-

2011-

2010-

2009-

2008-

2007-

2006-

2005-

2004-

2003-

2002-

2001-

2000-

1999-

1998-

1997-

0%

Private Sector

As Graph 1 shows, the number of Ontario employees involved in part-time employment, a form of
employment particularly common among women,8 increased considerably between 1976 and 1993, and
has since stabilized at high levels. In addition, as many employers pursued lexibility-enhancing labour
strategies in an attempt to reduce their labour costs, especially those associated with termination or
severance pay, the share of non-permanent employment including contract/term, seasonal, casual,
agency, and on-call employment more than doubled, from 5% in 1989 to 13% in 2016. From 1997 to 2005,
there was a steady increase in the share of temporary employees, especially in the public sector, before
it stabilized at relatively high levels (Graph 2).

B. Dimensions of Precariousness
Trends in forms of employment tell only a partial story of the spread of precarious employment in
Ontario. Dimensions of labour market insecurity, such as lack of control over the labour process, low
income, the degree of certainty of continuing employment, and access to regulatory protection, are also
a part of the experience of precarious employment. As well, a number of indicators of such dimensions
are particularly relevant to employment standards and their enforcement.
Union status is a critical indicator of degree of control over the labour process. It afects the extent to
which employees rely upon minimum employment standards because those who lack access to a
collective agreement regulating workplace conditions and grievance processes (i.e., non-unionized
employees) rely exclusively on the ESA. Such employees also generally have limited capacity to assert
their voices in the workplace and tend to have more limited control over the pace and content of work
than do employees covered by a collective agreement. As Table 1 shows, the share of Ontario’s labour
force that is non-unionized is increasing, particularly in the private sector where it stood at 81% in 1997
and fully 86% in 2016.
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Low hourly wages are a clear indicator of low income, deined here as less than 2/3rds of the median
hourly wage for full-time employees (e.g., less than $16.49/hr in 2016).9 Low-income employees are
more likely to be reliant on minimum employment standards, such as those setting out minimum wages.
The share of employees in Ontario’s labour force earning low wages is increasing. Considering both
public and private sector employees, it grew from 26% in 1997 to 31% in 2016. In the private sector, it
grew from 31% to fully 38% in the same period (Table 1).
Job tenure provides a good indicator of both a worker’s degree of certainty of continuing employment,
as well as protection from job churn. In the ESA, access to beneits such as vacation time only accrues
after 12 months of employment. In recent decades, the proportion of employees who had worked for
an employer for less than a year has remained around 20%. More notable, however, is that the share
of private sector employees with short job tenure is almost double that of the public sector, where (in
contrast to the private sector) a much higher rate of unionization has helped to ensure that workers have
the opportunity to apply for available positions, and develop their careers.
Finally, small irm size, an indicator of a lack of access to regulatory protection, is also a predictor of
limited ES enforcement. Employees in small irms (of fewer than 20) are less likely to see their rights
enforced as they are less likely to complain, and because it is diicult for an under-funded labour
inspectorate to spread its resources across workplaces. And yet a sizeable share of employees in
Ontario works in small irms: fully 22% of employees in the private sector in 2016 (Table 1).

Table 1: Indicators of Dimensions of Precariousness
1997

2006

2016

70.1%

72.0%

73.3%

Public sector employees

30.3%

29.2%

27.8%

Private sector employees

80.8%

83.4%

86.3%

26.3%

27.1%

31.3%

Public sector employees

8.4%

8.7%

8.9%

Private sector employees

30.8%

31.8%

37.7%

17.8%

18.2%

19.1%

9.2%

10.7%

10.5%

20.0%

20.1%

21.5%

18.6%*

17.3%

17.4%

Public sector employees

4.2%

4.0%

2.5%

Private sector employees

22.3%

20.9%

21.6%

NON-UNIONIZED
All employees

LOW WAGE
All employees

JOB TENURE LESS THAN ONE YEAR
All employees
Public sector employees
Private sector employees

SMALL FIRM
All employees

Source: Labour Force Survey, 1997 to 2016. Annual data weights applied. For the years 1997 and 2006 weights are based on
2006 census data. For 2016 weights are based on 2011 census data.
*Data from 1998, since comparable 1997 data are not available.
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Multiple job-holding provides another indicator of both poor quality employment and economic
insecurity. Those employed in high quality jobs, with suicient income, beneits, and job security, would
presumably be unlikely to hold an additional job. In contrast, low income, few beneits, and insecurity
may prompt employees to seek out additional employment. In the two decades between 1976 and
1996, the proportion of employees who simultaneously held an additional job (or jobs) more than
doubled (Graph 3). In 2016, approximately one in every 20 employees worked an additional job.

Graph 3: Multiple Job Holders, Ontario 10
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C. Who’s Most Afected by Precarious Employment?
The prevalence of precarious employment is shaped by form of employment and also by sex, age,
and immigration status. In other words, it afects workers belonging to certain social groups more than
others. As Table 2 shows, employees in part-time temporary employment, a form of employment
that is increasing in Ontario and that is deined by both uncertainty and a paucity of hours, experience
extensive precariousness. Eighty-two percent of these employees are non-unionized, 70% earn low
wages, and 47% have worked at the same employer for less than a year. In contrast, employees in
full-time permanent employment are the least likely to experience precariousness. In particular, they
are much less likely to earn low wages or to have short job-tenure than workers in all other forms of
employment. Notably, part-time workers – both permanent and temporary – are more likely to report
holding multiple jobs, suggesting that for some of these workers, their part-time status is involuntary
and does not provide suicient income.
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Table 2: The Relationship between Form of Employment and Indicators of Precarious
Employment, Ontario 2016
Indicator of
Precarious Employment

Economic
Stability

No union

Small irm

Low wage

Short-tenure

73.3%

17.4%

31.3%

19.1%

5.2%

Full-time Permanent

72.0%

15.8%

21.5%

12.4%

3.8%

Full-time Temporary

74.2%

18.8%

45.0%

48.9%

6.2%

Part-time Permanent

76.8%

23.3%

65.1%

29.6%

10.9%

Part-time Temporary

82.4%

22.7%

69.8%

46.7%

10.6%

All employees

Multiple Jobs

FORM OF EMPLOYMENT

Source: 2016 Labour Force Survey weighted using annual weights

Given the rise of precarious employment, its tendency to afect certain social groups of employees more
than others, and such groups’ considerable reliance on employment standards as a source of protection,
it is necessary to ensure that Ontario’s ESA establishes a minimum loor of enforceable rights for all.
In terms of social location, young people aged 15 to 24 are far more likely to experience precariousness
than older workers. In part, this experience is attributable to their tendency to hold part-time and
temporary forms of employment, which are themselves often characterized by dimensions of labour
market insecurity. Compared to their older counterparts, young people are more likely to hold nonunionized positions, work in small irms, earn low wages, and to have short job tenure. In addition, young
people are more likely to report working multiple jobs.
Gender also shapes Ontario employees’ experience of precariousness. Most notably, women are much
more likely than men to earn low wages: in 2016, more than a third of women (36%) earned low wages,
compared to only 27% of men.
Recent immigrants, that is, those who immigrated less than ive years ago, also experience high rates of
precarious employment in Ontario. They are more likely to hold temporary positions than are Canadianborn or settled immigrants in the province. Almost 20% of recent immigrants engage in temporary
employment compared to 12% of Canadian-born or settled immigrants. Recent immigrants are also
more likely to have jobs that are non-unionized and low waged and to have a job tenure of less than one
year. However, a slightly higher percentage of Canadian-born or settled immigrants are employed in
multiple jobs (5.3% to 3.7%).
The gendered nature of certain facets of precariousness is even more pronounced among recent
immigrants than among those that are more settled or Canadian-born. For instance, recent immigrant
women are more likely than their male counterparts to be employed in small irms, whereas no such
gender disparity exists among more settled immigrants and the Canadian-born. At the same time,
diferences in the share of low-wage employment between recent immigrant men and recent immigrant
women (a 5 percentage point diference) are smaller than those among settled immigrants and the
Canadian-born (a 9 percentage point diference), due in part to the much higher proportion of recent
immigrant men holding low wage jobs.
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Table 3: The Relationship between Socio-demographic Characteristics and Form of
Employment/Indicators of Precarious Employment, Ontario 2016
Form of
Employment

Economic
Stability

Indicator of
Precarious Employment

Parttime

Temp.

No union

Small
irm

Low
wage

Shorttenure

Multiple
Jobs

18.1%

12.6%

73.3%

17.4%

31.3%

19.1%

5.2%

15 to 24

49.7%

32.3%

88.1%

21.8%

79.7%

51.0%

7.3%

25 to 54

10.5%

9.1%

71.1%

15.9%

21.5%

15.1%

5.0%

55+

19.3%

9.3%

69.3%

18.9%

26.7%

7.0%

4.1%

Men

12.1%

12.1%

74.7%

17.6%

27.1%

19.1%

4.1%

Women

24.0%

13.2%

72.0%

17.2%

35.5%

19.0%

6.3%

Recent immigrants

16.9%

19.7%

88.6%

18.6%

49.2%

38.1%

3.7%

Canadian-born / settled
immigrants

18.1%

12.2%

72.7%

17.3%

30.7%

18.2%

5.3%

9.7%

20.2%

89.4%

17.4%

46.6%

38.7%

3.8%

Recent immigrant women

24.9%

19.2%

87.7%

20.1%

52.2%

37.5%

3.6%

Canadian-born / settled
immigrant men

12.1%

11.5%

74.0%

17.6%

26.4%

18.2%

4.2%

Canadian-born / settled
immigrant women

24.0%

12.8%

71.5%

17.0%

34.9%

18.2%

6.3%

All employees

AGE GROUP

GENDER

IMMIGRATION

GENDER & IMMIGRATION
Recent immigrant men

Source: 2016 Labour Force Survey weighted using annual weights
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COVERAGE OF THE ESA
A fundamental inadequacy of the ESA stems from its narrow deinitions of ‘employee’, which establishes
who is covered by the loor of workplace protections, and ‘employer’, which establishes who is
responsible for meeting the conditions of the legislation. Changes to the organization of employment
are placing more people who need workplace protections outside the scope of the ESA. At the same
time, the increased use of sub-contracting and franchising mean that often more than one entity is
directing or supervising work, and in control of conditions of work and employment, while bearing little if
any responsibility for observing the ESA’s provisions. In addition, the ESA’s many exemptions and special
rules have created a patchwork of standards that lack principled justiication and that foster exploitative
conditions. Employment conditions for many Ontarians are poised to worsen unless the scope of the
ESA’s coverage and liability are updated to relect current workplace realties.

3. Scope of Coverage of the ESA
The ESA applies to “an employee and his or her employer” and thus excludes as “independent
contractors” all persons engaged in work for remuneration who do not clearly fall within the traditional
legal parameters of employment. In reality, however, employment and independent contracting do not
exist as discrete categories separated by a bright line, but rather are endpoints on a spectrum of work
arrangements.11 Many irms are constructing work arrangements that are neither clearly employment
nor independent contracting. As the current class action lawsuit of Uber drivers in Ontario seeking
employee status makes clear, ‘new’ forms of work for remuneration are making it more and more diicult
to determine who is covered by the ESA.12Although the proportion of self-employed workers who
employ others has remained relatively stable over the last four decades, between 1990 and 2000, there
was a substantial increase in the proportion of workers in Ontario who reported being self-employed
with no additional employees (see Graph 4). Some of this self-employment likely relects increased
entrepreneurialism in the face of the recession of the early 1990s, as well as the rise of new technologies
that enabled the growth of freelance work. However, some of this growth in solo self-employment might
also be attributable to the issuring of employment that occurred hand-in-hand with the adoption of
employment policies oriented to global production chains, as workers previously deined as employees
were converted to independent contractors, some of whom may be misclassiied as such.
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Graph 4: Self-Employment, Ontario 13
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Growing uncertainty around the ESA’s coverage also fuels the misclassiication of employees as
independent contractors so that employers can evade their legal obligations under the Act. While
reliable statistical data on the prevalence of misclassiication in Canada does not yet exist, it is
recognized as a frequent occurrence in Ontario.14 In the United States, recent studies estimate that
between 10% and 20% of employers misclassify at least one of their employees as an independent
contractor, and that misclassiication is likely increasing.15 Misclassiication prevents workers from
accessing workplace protections, as well as other employment-related beneits such as workers’
compensation and employment insurance. Misclassiication also deprives government of much-needed
payroll and income taxes.

“I don’t understand. I work for them. I’m not selfemployed. But that’s what they tell us.”
Rebecca, Personal Support Worker
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“I became an independent contractor, though …
I was required to be in a speciic location, what I
was doing was already delegated, and everything
was really mapped and controlled for me, so it
allowed them not to pay me overtime and justify
not giving me breaks.”
Hanna, Social Service Worker

Misclassiication in and of itself is not a violation of the ESA; rather, a violation occurs when the employer
fails to provide an employee with a minimum standard required by the Act. As a result, disputes about
misclassiication arise when employers are alleged to have violated a standard either as a result of a
complaint16 or an inspection conducted by an Employment Standards Oicer (ESO).17 The status quo
with regard to misclassiication, therefore, is one in which the issue is only raised if a worker makes a
complaint alleging that he or she is an employee who is being deprived of the protection of the ESA, or if
an ESO conducts an inspection in which he or she makes an assessment that one or more workers is an
employee whose ESA entitlements are being violated. Misclassiication, as such, is not the direct target
of the legislation.

WHAT WE NEED
EXPAND THE ESA TO ENCOMPASS DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Expand the deinition of employee to encompass dependent contractors. Such a
provision would be a positive step that responds to the reality that work arrangements
exist on a continuum and that the traditional category of employee may not adequately
capture the full range of workers who are in need of statutory protection against
unacceptable forms of work or working conditions. The deinition of dependent
contractor must be broad enough to cover the growing number of workers engaged
in so-called ‘gig work’. The efect of such a measure would be to extend outwards the
boundaries of workplace protections.
In addition, introducing regulatory power to deem particular groups of workers to be
employees would enable the government to expand the scope of coverage without
having to amend the ESA in the event that the adjudicative process fails to do so
appropriately.

MAKE MISCLASSIFICATION AN OFFENCE
Although legislative proposals are emerging, there is currently no provision in the ESA
that makes employee misclassiication an ofence. The detection of misclassiication
depends on employee complaints under other employment standards or on proactive
inspections. Amending the ESA to make employee misclassiication a separate and
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distinct ofence is necessary to reduce its occurrence. Such provisions exist in other
jurisdictions, such as in California’s Employee Misclassiication Act, which came into
efect in 2012. In this instance, this state amended its labour code to levy substantial ines
on employers found guilty of “willful” misclassiication of employees as independent
contractors. These include a civil penalty between $5,000 and $15,000 USD for each
violation, which can be increased to $10,000 and to $25,000 USD if the activity is
deemed to be repeated. The Employee Misclassiication Act also mobilizes the threat
of reputational loss: it requires employers found to have misclassiied workers to display
a notice on the company website, or in another prominent space, which indicates that
“the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or a court…has found that the person
or employer has committed a serious violation of the law by engaging in the willful
misclassiication of employees.”18 Making misclassiication an ofence would also allow
the Ministry of Labour to begin tracking the prevalence of misclassiication complaints.

INTRODUCE A PRESUMPTION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS
Create a legal presumption of employee status for workers performing or providing
labour services for a fee. The efect of a legal presumption of employment status
is to shift the burden of proving that a worker is not an employee onto employers.
To strengthen the presumption, the law could also specify what the employer must
demonstrate to overcome the presumption.

4. Employer Liability
The scope of employer liability established under the ESA is increasingly outmoded. Traditionally, the
direct employer was the entity liable for complying with the employment standards. But the increasing
use of sub-contracting, franchising, supply chains, and temporary help agencies means that there is
often more than one entity involved (directly or indirectly) in directing, controlling, or supervising the
employee. These arrangements often result in inancial beneits for the lead entity while also increasing
the risk of employment standards violations and inefective enforcement for employees.19 Moreover, the
lead entity often has the capacity to rectify the problem by insisting on contractual terms that hold the
immediate employer responsible for complying with the ESA. For these reasons, it is no longer adequate
to impose duties only on direct employers narrowly conceived. The current law permits liability to be
imposed on parties that are found to be related employers; however, this extension of liability does not
go far enough. As a result, the law creates incentives to enter into particular arrangements because they
enable one party to avoid legal duties under the ESA. Employer liability should therefore be expanded
so that other parties can be made jointly responsible for the duties imposed on the direct employer.20

WHAT WE NEED
The scope of the existing related employer provision should be expanded, as should
provisions for joint and several liability.
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ENHANCE RELATED EMPLOYER PROVISIONS
The existing related employer liability provision that extends employer status to entities
in addition to the direct employer should be expanded and be based on an economic
realities test.
To achieve this result, it is necessary to repeal the “intent or efect” requirement that
currently must be met to establish related employer liability – a legislative proposal
currently under consideration in the province. In other provincial jurisdictions’ employment
standards legislation, related employer provisions simply require that the businesses are
associated or related. Ontario is unique in further requiring that the “intent or efect” of the
arrangement directly or indirectly defeats the purpose of the ESA. The Ontario Labour
Relations Board has adopted a narrow interpretation of the “intent or efect” requirement
that imposes a stringent causation test in order to establish related employer liability.
The implementation of this interpretation has resulted in employees who have sufered
signiicant monetary violations being unable to collect what they are owed despite the
fact that the parent corporation or one of its subsidiaries continues to operate.

EXPAND JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Employers who enter into contracts with subcontractors and other intermediaries, either
directly or indirectly, must be liable both separately and together for money owed and
statutory entitlements under the ESA and its regulations.
There are precedents in the ESA for imposing duties more broadly, even absent a inding
that two entities are related employers. For example, shareholder and subsequently
director liability for unpaid wages dates back to the irst general incorporation statutes.21
Related employer provisions are also a longstanding feature of employment standards
statutes and more recently client liability for non-payment by temporary help agencies
(THAs) (the legal employer) were added.22
If more than one entity is directing, controlling, or supervising the work and is in control of
the employment conditions, whether that control is exercised or not, then they should be
held jointly and severally liable for complying with the ESA. Such measures are efective
in fostering compliance at the bottom of supply chains.23
As a means of ensuring compliance with the ESA, joint and several liability should also
be applied to franchisors. Franchisors have extensive power over franchisees. Franchise
agreements impose detailed requirements on franchisees and control how they conduct
their businesses to ensure that customers will have the same experience in every
franchised location and to protect the brand. In this context, it would not be diicult
for franchisors to include requirements regarding ESA compliance in the franchise
agreement as well as to provide the franchisor with remedies against the franchisee in
the event of an ESA violation for which it is jointly liable.
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5. Exemptions and Special Rules

“…They tried to twist my role into a management
role, so I that I wouldn’t be eligible for overtime.”
Hanna, Social Service Worker

“Public holiday pay, well … we don’t get that
because we’re cab drivers exempt from public
holiday and overtime. I think that should change.”
Walter, Taxi Driver

Despite the fact that the ESA is intended to establish minimum working conditions and terms of
employment in Ontario, exemptions and special rules have been adopted to allow for deviation
or exemption from compliance with certain standards. Exemptions and special rules have been
incorporated into the ESA largely on the basis of the perceived need for ‘special treatment’ for certain
industries, occupations, or sectors.24 As a result, the ESA and its regulations include a complex web of
more than 85 exemptions, partial exemptions, and qualifying conditions, which limit the application of
its protections.25 Indeed, the majority of Ontario employees are afected by exemptions or special rules
such that fewer than a quarter are estimated to be fully covered by the provisions of the ESA (only one
in ive are fully covered if eligibility for severance pay is not taken into account).26 This is a point of great
concern as, globally, research demonstrates that modiied or curtailed access to ES protection is a
feature of precarious employment – and one that magniies enforcement problems.27
When assessing ES coverage and exemptions, it is crucial to do so in relation to the principles that
guided the development of the ESA itself, these being social minima, universality, and fairness.28 The
wide range of exemptions and special rules that have evolved over time, often following industry
lobbying, has had a demonstrably corrosive efect on the ESA’s stated commitment to these principles.
This corrosion calls for reconsidering existing exemptions with the aim of eliminating those that are
unprincipled and/or that undermine the core principles of the Act.
The principle of social minima refers to standards that constitute minimum acceptable conditions of
employment.29 Exemptions and special rules undermine the principle of social minima as they lower the
loor for certain groups of workers. Any assessment of exemptions should seek to attend to whether they
have the potential to adversely afect workers who have been historically disadvantaged in the labour
market, or who are becoming disadvantaged. By establishing social minima that workers – particularly
those in precarious employment – cannot fall below, Ontario positions itself as a jurisdiction that is
committed and attentive to the promotion of ‘decent work’, as well as the maintenance of human rights
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and Charter protections against discrimination.
The principle of universality refers to “extend[ing] the minimum beneits of the legislation to the greatest
possible number of employees.”30 The Special Advisor’s Interim Report for the Changing Workplaces
Review acknowledges the importance of universality, asserting that, since exemptions normally reduce
or curtail rights,31 “the ESA should be applied to as many employees as possible and that departures
from, or modiications to, the norm should be limited and justiiable”.32 This goal of universal, or nearuniversal, coverage supports an approach whereby the default position is that exemptions should be
eliminated unless an employer can clearly establish a case for their retention.
Finally, the principle of fairness involves protecting both workers against exploitation and employers
against unfair competition due to lower standards.33 As noted in the Special Advisors’ Interim Report,
a core principle for justifying an exemption is that the nature of work is such that applying a standard
would “preclude a particular type of work from being done at all or would signiicantly alter its output;
the work could not continue to exist in anything close to its present form.”34 Stringently applying this
principle ensures fairness for both employees and employers. That is, employers should not gain a
competitive advantage by depriving employees of their rights.
The elimination of exemptions and special rules is thus necessary as a matter of principle. Given
the role of industry lobbying in creating many exemptions, the lack of transparency surrounding
their establishment,35 and the piecemeal nature of prevailing rules, a review on a sectoral basis is
not advisable. Speciically, a sectoral approach threatens to perpetuate the existing unprincipled
patchwork.36 Exemptions counter the fundamental role and efectiveness of the ESA and thereby serve
to compromise many employees’ access to regulatory protection.
Certain groups are disproportionately afected by the ESA’s exemptions and special rules.37 Nonunionized employees are more likely to be exempt from one or more ESA provision. Forty-two percent of
non-unionized employees have at least one exemption, compared to only 26% of unionized employees,
a group presumed to be protected by collective agreements. Young employees (aged 15 to 29) are
less likely to be fully covered by the ESA, and more likely to be subject to special rules than older
employees. For example, 27% of young employees have special rules relating to public holiday pay,
compared to only 20% of employees overall. Women are more likely to be afected by special rules for
minimum wage and personal emergency leave. Low-wage employees38 are much less likely to be fully
covered by all of the provisions of the ESA, and are more likely to have special rules relating to minimum
wage, public holidays, and vacation time/pay compared to higher waged employees. Only slightly more
than 23% of low-wage employees are fully covered by all of the provisions of the ESA, compared to 39%
of employees overall (excluding severance pay coverage).39
As Table 4 demonstrates, the economic costs of employment standards exemptions and special rules
are heavy for Ontario employees. In 2014, the exemptions and special rules for minimum wage, overtime
pay, holiday pay, and vacation pay were associated with a loss of approximately $45 million to Ontario
employees each week.
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Table 4: Costs of ESA coverage, special rules, and exemptions, overall and by provision40
Weighted
Population

Sum of Absolute
Costs ($)

MINIMUM WAGE
Weekly cost for special rules

62,819

$804,226

Weekly cost for exempt

14,077

$567,788

Weekly cost for special rules and exemptions

76,529

$1,368,628

Weekly cost for special rules

30,320

$1,782,048

Weekly cost for exempt

65,582

$7,707,186

Weekly cost for special rules and exemptions

95,902

$9,489,234

426,811

$18,006,295

289,048

$16,151,239

243,076

-

101,732

-

556,523

$45,015,395

OVERTIME PAY

PUBLIC HOLIDAYS
Weekly cost for exempt

VACATION PAY
Weekly cost for exempt

TERMINATION PAY
Lump sum cost for exempt

SEVERANCE PAY
Lump sum cost for exempt

TOTAL WEEKLY COSTS
(includes minimum wage, overtime pay, public holiday
pay and vacation pay)

Some special rules provide for higher standards for certain types of employees. For example, the
minimum wage for a homeworker is 110% of the general minimum wage rate. In principle, as they are
compensatory, such provisions should be retained, as should future measures that seek to alleviate
structural disadvantage.

WHAT WE NEED
Given the extensive hardships faced by some groups, priorities for eliminating
exemptions and special rules should include the following:

ELIMINATE UNPRINCIPLED AND UNJUSTIFIED EXEMPTIONS
Exemptions that lack a principled justiication should be a priority for elimination. Chief
examples of such exemptions are:
1)

The personal emergency leave exemption for workers employed in irms of fewer
than 50 employees currently slated for elimination under the province’s proposed
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legislative amendments to the ESA.
2) Exemptions and special rules applicable to residential care workers and residential
building superintendents, janitors and caretakers, and homecare/personal support
employees who provide homemaking/personal support services, occupational
groups in which women and recent immigrants are found in large numbers.
3) The special minimum wage rates for students under 18, and the student exemption
from the “three-hour rule” (relying on a vague deinition of student status unrelated to
the nature of work being performed).
4) The special minimum wage rate for liquor servers (overwhelmingly a group of women
and young people much more likely to live in low-income households and to hold
multiple jobs).
5) Exemptions from overtime pay and all ive of the standards relating to hours of
work for IT professionals (since the nature of the work these occupations perform
is not precluded by adherence to minimum employment standards and given the
accelerated growth of these occupations in Ontario).
6) The broad exemption for managers and supervisors. To minimize the problem of
misclassiication of employees as managers for the purpose of evading employment
standards, it is necessary to further deine this category. This exemption should
only be retained for managers (not supervisors), whose primary duty must be the
performance of oice or non-manual work directly related to the management or
general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers, and who
earn more than a certain amount in wages/salary.41
7) Exemptions and special rules in the area of minimum wages, working time, vacations
and leaves, and public holidays that apply to agricultural workers. Archival records
indicate that in past reviews of agricultural exemptions, the Ministry of Labour has
indicated that improving statutory protection of farm employees should eliminate
the discriminatory status of farm employees under the legislation (created by
exemptions), eliminate unfair wage competition in the industry, provide assurance of
minimum earnings and working conditions, and improve the status of farm workers.
We concur with the Ministry’s historic calls to remedy the occupational exclusions
associated with agricultural work, broadly deined.42

ESTABLISH STRICT CRITERIA FOR RETAINING/ESTABLISHING EXEMPTIONS
AND SPECIAL RULES
In order for an employment standards exemption or special rule to be retained and/or
created, all of the following criteria should be met:
1)

The nature of work in an industry is such that it is impractical for a minimum standard
to apply. Applying the standard would preclude a particular type of work from
being done at all or would signiicantly alter its output; the work could not continue
to exist in anything close to its present form.43 “Nature” of the work relates to the
characteristics of the work itself. It does not relate to the quantity or cost of work
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produced by a given number of employees, as all employment standards afect work
output and costs. Nor does it relate to the nature of the employer and how they have
organized work.
2) The work under consideration is considered to be “decent work,” as deined by the
International Labour Organization.44
3) The work provides a social, labour market, or economic contribution that argues for its
continued existence in its present form, even in the absence of one or more minimum
standards applying to it.
4) Employers in an industry do not directly or indirectly control the working conditions
that are relevant to the employment standard under consideration. “Employers” is to
be interpreted broadly, referring to companies both up and down the contracting/
sub-contracting chain (i.e., parent and/or subsidiary companies and subcontractors).
5) The employee group to whom the exemption or special rule would apply be readily
identiiable, to prevent confusion and misapplication of the exemption/special rule.
6) Both employees and employers in the industry agree that a special rule or exemption
is desirable.
7) Based on the current composition of the labour force, the employees to whom
the exemption or special rule would apply are not historically disadvantaged or
precariously situated in the labour market. That is, employment standards exemptions
and special rules should not compound existing labour market disadvantage.

ESTABLISH A PROCESS FOR RETAINING/ESTABLISHING EXEMPTIONS AND
SPECIAL RULES
1)

In addition to immediately eliminating exemptions that are patently unjustiied, the
government should review the remaining exemptions to ensure that they meet the
criteria speciied above, in a timely way.

2) The review process should remain as centralized as possible; that is, in order
to ensure equality across sectors and industries, there must be key actors who
are involved in the review of multiple sectors, to provide context and promote
consistency. Many exemptions, such as those for continuous operation businesses,
are applicable to multiple sectors and/or are not sector speciic, and should be
addressed through a centralized process. While we retain the concerns about a
sectoral approach outlined above, if sectoral committees are established, they should
be as broad and inclusive as possible, in order to ensure that disparities do not occur
between workers doing similar jobs within a sector, even though they may have a
slightly diferent industrial classiication. One proposed sectoral structure, deined in
response to existing ESA exemptions and special rules, is set out in Appendix 2.
3) The process should prioritize the review of exemptions and special rules based
on the degree of precariousness characterizing employment in a given industry,
occupation, or grouping and the number of people afected by exemptions or special
rules therein.
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4) The review process should be tripartite, including an equal number of employee
and employer representatives, as well as a neutral arbitrator as Chair. Employee
representatives might be solicited from employee groups, professional associations,
unions active in the sector, or workers’ centres and legal clinics with experience in the
sector. Employer representatives might be solicited from industry associations, lead
companies, or franchisors in the sector, and include the perspectives of both large
and small employers. The size of any review committee should be determined by
the need to be able to have meaningful dialogue between the parties, as well as the
number/complexity of the exemptions and special rules being considered.
5) The review process must involve soliciting feedback and information from afected
employers and employees, as well as the public and any other interested parties
(e.g., consumer groups). This might occur via online or mailed submissions and/or
in-person sessions. Review committees would also have the lexibility to conduct
surveys or votes among employees and/or employers, as appropriate. And they
would seek, and the Ministry of Labour would fund, as appropriate, any needed
independent expert advice, as well as provide administrative support.
6) Each review committee would advise the Minister, consistent with the current
practice that regulations under the ESA are made by Cabinet on the advice of the
Ministry.
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ENFORCEMENT
In the face of persistent precariousness in Ontario’s labour market, expanding the ESA’s scope of
coverage and eliminating its exemptions are necessary for the fullest range of people in Ontario to
beneit from its protections. But these reforms will not fulill their promise if they are not accompanied
by changes to the ESA’s enforcement regime. Without substantial improvements to enforcement,
employment standards will remain beyond the reach of the precariously employed in Ontario.

6. Individual Claims and Reprisals

“When you are new in the country, you don’t want
to start to make problems or be a problem.”
Jackie, Oice Worker

“When I started there, holidays came and I
started wondering how come we didn’t get a
holiday pay? The manager at the time said that
the company said they are not going to pay us…
So I iled with the [Ministry of] Labour in August
of 2013 and the claim ended up being settled
… so they had to pay all of us out … Six months
after the claim was settled I lost my job … over
the phone. No written warning, no notice, no
nothing…”
Carolina, Retail Worker

The ESA is enforced primarily by investigating workers’ individual claims of employer ESA violations.45
Studies of other jurisdictions show that only a small fraction of violations will ever be redressed formally
through the enforcement system since the vast majority of employees who experience a workplace
violation do not complain. Reporting on the U.S. case, for example, researchers estimate that for every
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130 violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime provisions, only one complaint is received by
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division.46
The decision of an employee to ile a complaint hinges on their perception of the efectiveness of the
Ministry of Labour’s investigation process, the assistance available throughout the complaint process,
the likelihood of recovering what they are owed, and the risk of employer retaliation. Research shows,
however, that only a small minority of employees attempt to access the legislative protections of
employment standards while still employed in the job in which they experienced violations. Consistently
fewer than 10% of complaints in each iscal year47 from 2007/08 to 2014/15 came from employees
who were still working for the employer that they were iling a complaint against.48 The extremely
low proportion of employees who ile complaints against their employers while still on the job has
remained relatively constant across time. The Auditor General of Ontario reported a similarly low level
of complaints from employees on the job over a decade ago.49 This problem makes visible the power
imbalances in the employment relationship, which often make the exercise of employee voice via
complaints about employment standards violations very risky, and that these risks are not ofset by
conidence in the ability of the Ministry of Labour to secure payment of what they are owed and to
protect them against unlawful retaliation. While we address the issue of recovery below, our focus here
is the fear of reprisals.
Amendments to the ESA in 2010 introduced the requirement that most employees must irst attempt
to resolve an ESA violation with their employer before iling a complaint for unpaid wages or other
ESA entitlements with the Ministry of Labour. While there are some exceptions to this rule for certain
categories of employees, it assumes that employees can and should seek resolution prior to iling a
complaint.50 There is evidence that the requirement is now an entrenched feature of the complaints
system. Indeed, between 2011/12 and 2014/15, more than 4 out of 5 complainants reported that they
had either contacted or attempted to contact their employer.51 The most commonly cited reason
complainants give for not contacting their employer is fear.52
Between 2008/09 and 2012/13, the number of employment standards complaints submitted annually
dropped substantially, but levelled of starting in 2012/13.53 Yet the number of non-unionized Ontario
employees increased during that time period. In 2008/09, there was one complaint submitted for every
173 non-unionized employees in Ontario, while in 2014/15, there was one complaint submitted for every
285 non-unionized employees (see Graph 5).54 Given the persistence of precarious employment over
the past decade in Ontario,55 it is highly unlikely that the reduction in complaints received relects lower
rates of employer non-compliance. A more likely explanation is that the requirement for employees to
attempt to resolve their complaint with their employers prior to iling with the Ministry of Labour has
served to further discourage employees from coming forward.
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Graph 5: Employment Standards Complaints Submitted to the Ministry of Labour, Relative to the
Number of Non-Unionized Employees in Ontario, 2008/09 to 2014/1556
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The ESA prohibits employers from intimidating, dismissing, or penalizing employees who attempt to
exercise their rights therein. Employer reprisal, which can entail receiving undesirable assignments and
schedules, being subject to harassment from management or co-employees, or being terminated,
has been a longstanding factor in discouraging employees from initiating employment standards
complaints.57 The onus of proof that an employer’s action was not a reprisal is on the employer. If an ESO
inds that a reprisal has taken place, he or she can order compensation and reinstatement. Yet, reprisal
provisions on the books often fail to protect employees who are still employed with the employer
against whom the complaint has been made.
Evidence suggests that fear of reprisals remains a signiicant deterrent to employees accessing the
ESA complaints system. Reprisals are being claimed more often than before. Whereas in 2007/08
reprisal claims were included in 6% of all complaints, the proportion of complaints that have a reprisal
claim have grown steadily each year, increasing to 9% in 2010/11 and 10% in 2014/15.58 Put diferently,
the share of complaints that include a claim of reprisal almost doubled between 2007/08 and 2014/15.
This increase in reprisal claims is not surprising given the new opportunities for reprisals lowing from
the 2010 requirement that employees must disclose the nature of their grievance to their employer as a
condition of iling a complaint.
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Graph 6: Reprisal Claims, by Complainant’s Work Status, 2007/08 to 2014/1559
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Moreover, reprisal claims appear to be diicult to substantiate. Even though the onus is on employers to
disprove reprisals, employees still have to prove their case, a requirement often necessitating extensive
documentary evidence and quite complicated legal arguments. Only a fraction of reprisal claims iled
by employees are validated by the Ministry of Labour. In addition, from 2008/09 to 2014/15, only 1.6% of
complaints with an ES violation included inancial restitution for a reprisal claim.60

WHAT WE NEED
ALLOW ANONYMOUS COMPLAINTS
Employees are currently unable to ile anonymous complaints. Anonymous complaints
would be helpful in encouraging reporting and in preventing reprisals. They provide
the most protection for employees who are still on the job that they are complaining
about. Available elsewhere in Canada,61 anonymous complaints would allow for the
concealment of the identity of the employee or party who originally made a complaint
by investigating and pursuing orders for multiple employees if violations involving other
employees are found. The complainant would still have her or his complaint addressed,
while the employer would likely be less able to discern which employee(s) iled the
original complaint. In cases where no other violations are found in the inspection, the
complainant(s) could then be informed that the completion of the complaint will require
that the facts of their particular case will need to be revealed to the employer and the
complainant could then have the option of withdrawing the complaint.62
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ALLOW THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS
Third party complaints that also preserve anonymity have a number of signiicant
advantages. First, third party organizations, such as worker centres, legal clinics, or
unions, may have a better understanding of the employees’ situation given common
background, knowledge, and experiences, which can be important in building enough
trust to overcome barriers of suspicion and fear.63 Second, third party organizations
typically have built up their own expertise and knowledge of the law and connections
with the government inspectorate, which give them insights into the complaints-making
and investigation process and which can be of considerable assistance to employees
making complaints. Third, these organizations can also ofer employees a collective
mechanism through which they can jointly ile complaints and arguably merit greater
resources.64
Any system of anonymous, conidential, or third party complaints would require the
elimination of the requirement for complainants to contact their employers introduced
under the Open for Business Act (2010).

ELIMINATE THE EMPLOYEE CONTACT REQUIREMENT
The requirement, introduced in the Open for Business Act, that an employee irst directly
confront their employer about a complaint may deter an employee from initiating a
complaint. In the context of what are often already precarious employment relationships
characterized by unequal power relations, it provides opportunity for an employer to
pressure an employee not to go forward to the Ministry of Labour. As recognized by
the Special Advisors to the Changing Workplaces Review and the current provincial
government, this requirement should be removed.

EXPEDITE REPRISAL INVESTIGATIONS
The investigation of reprisals should be expedited to address the current six months,
on average, that it takes for a reprisal investigation to be completed.65 This delay means
that employees, many of whom have limited inancial resources, are forced to deal
with the economic and other consequences of reprisals for an extended period of
time. In this context, even if a reprisal is found, there may be inancial and reputational
damage done to the individual, potentially exacerbating the spreading of fear among
employees.66 Monetary penalties for reprisals remain low in Ontario. While reinstatement
and compensation for lost wages can be seen as costs by employers, these costs are
relatively minimal for actions that have profound consequences both for individual
employees and the rule of law in the employment context.
One speciic issue surrounding the problem of reprisals in Ontario meriting special note
concerns employees enrolled in the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, and other
Temporary Foreign Worker Programs, who face additional barriers to making a complaint.
Employees in these situations face increased risks of reprisals, particularly due to their
precarious residency status in Canada, which is tied to their employment contract.67 In
this context, employers should be prohibited from forcing deportation of an employee
who has iled an ESA complaint and those who are found to have engaged in unlawful
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reprisals should face the possibility of being excluded from the program. In addition,
Ministry of Labour oicials should work with the federal government to ensure that
migrant employees who have iled complaints are granted open work permits so that
they may continue to work while their complaint is investigated.

CONTINUE ESO INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS
The Final Report of the Changing Workplace Review recommends that the Director of
Employment Standards should be given the discretion to decline to have a complaint
investigated by an ESO and instead leave it for the complainant to pursue his or her claim
before the Ontario Labour Relations Board (Final Report 2017, 75-83). However, the Final
Report’s Recommendation 14 speciically provides that claims alleging reprisals or that
will likely lead to an expanded investigation should be given priority for investigation. We
address the question of ending the general requirement for all claims to be investigated
in Part 9 of this report. With regard to alleged reprisals, which are a crude manifestation
of unequal power relations, there should be no discretion to decline to investigate. In
such circumstances, employees should never be put in the position where they are
responsible for pursuing a remedy against their employer in an adversarial forum.

7. Recovery: Voluntary Compliance, Orders to Pay Wages,
and Settlements

“I haven’t been paid… and I’m very upset about
that part. There has been no penalty… She [the
employer] hasn’t responded and she’s just letting
it go. And I’m out of that money. I feel that I
should get interest on the money.”
Sheila, Cleaner

Recovering monies owed to complainants has traditionally been the central purpose of the ESA’s
complaints system. A number of tools can be used to recover back wages. First, employees are
encouraged to attempt to resolve complaints with their employer. If self-resolution is not possible and an
employee iles a complaint, another set of measures comes into play. In the case of employers with no
history of violations, or with previous violations of diferent standards, ESOs are generally encouraged to
seek voluntary compliance from employers. If voluntary compliance does not appear possible, an ESO
can issue an Order to Pay.68 At any point in the process, the complainant and their employer can agree to
settle.69
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Despite the range of recovery mechanisms, the collection of back wages has long been a weak link in
Ontario’s employment standards enforcement system. The hardship of non-recovery can be substantial
for workers given the often large amounts of money at stake. Between 2012/13 to 2014/15, the median
total entitlement for complainants was $895, a substantial share of low wage earners’ weekly or monthly
earnings.70

Recovery of Orders to Pay
Data show that when employers agree to voluntary compliance, employees receive their entitlements.
However, when employer behaviour calls for the use of Orders to Pay, the rate of recovery drops
dramatically. When all complaints resulting in the issuance of an Order to Pay during the period
between 2009/10 and 2014/15 are considered, only 38% were fully satisied. The total assessment from
Orders to Pay during this time period was $43.5 million, of which only $15.9 million was recovered for
complainants.71
The challenges in recovering monetary orders represent a fundamental weakness in the enforcement
system. Employees may choose not to ile a complaint if they perceive that they will not recover their
legal entitlements. An inefective recovery system inadvertently incentivizes non-compliance with the
law for recalcitrant employers. Employers who violate employment standards already face a very small
chance of sufering adverse consequences for doing so.72 Given the limited resources for proactive
workplace inspections and the low rate of complaints among those who experience violations, noncompliant employers face little chance of being drawn into the enforcement system. In the event that
employers are subject to enforcement measures, they face little likelihood of having to do much more
than pay the wages that were already owed.

Settlements
Settlements are another avenue for providing money to complainants under Ontario’s ES enforcement
system. Through settlements a complainant and his or her employer agree to certain terms, and the
complaint is subsequently closed. A inancial settlement reached between a complainant and an
employer should not be considered recovered wages, however. This is because settlements do not
involve a formal investigation and a determination that money is owed to a complainant. Nevertheless,
as an increasingly prevalent outcome of complaints, settlements warrant discussion at this point.
Settlements are divided into two types: non-facilitated and facilitated. Non-facilitated73 settlements can
occur at any point after the complaint is iled and a written agreement must be provided to the ESO
outlining the agreement. Facilitated settlements74 were introduced under the Open for Business Act in
2010. They involve the ESO as an agreement facilitator between the employee and the employer. The
use of settlements in the complaints process has been increasing since 2008/09. The growing use of
settlements is accounted for almost entirely by the increased use of non-facilitated settlements, which
have almost tripled since 2009/10.75 Complaints resolved through facilitated settlements have remained
relatively steady since their introduction in 2010.
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Graph 7: Proportion of Complaints Closed via Settlements, by year of complaint76
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The use of settlements in employment standards enforcement regimes merits special consideration for
several reasons. Settlements potentially involve the negotiation of minimum standards instead of their
enforcement, which may lead employees to accept less than their legal entitlement.77 More broadly,
their use potentially allows for the contracting out of employment standards,78 and can turn questions
of law enforcement into matters of dispute resolution. The risk of employees accepting less than their
entitlement is exacerbated in a system in which wait times to have claims assessed can be extended
and the prospects of full recovery are highly uncertain.79
There is no assessment of the complainant’s legal entitlement when settlements occur. As a result,
settlement outcomes can only be assessed in relation to the total claim amount, and compared to the
validated entitlement in assessed cases. Not surprisingly, the larger the submitted total claim amount,
the less likely that it will be settled for 100% or more of that amount. Facilitated settlements, which
are generally used for higher-value claims, lead to inferior outcomes for workers compared to nonfacilitated settlements. In 2014/2015, almost 26% of non-facilitated settlements were settled for less
than half of an employee’s total initial claim. In the same year, 36% of cases with facilitated settlements
were settled for less than half of an employee’s total initial claim.80 What We Need

WHAT WE NEED
ESTABLISH A WAGE PROTECTION FUND
A wage protection fund is needed to help compensate employees whose employers do
not comply with Orders to Pay. Certain protections are already available to employees
whose employer is formally bankrupt or insolvent. Under the Federal Government’s
Wage Earner Protection Program, employees who worked for a formally bankrupt or
insolvent employer are eligible to receive up to nearly $4,000 in unpaid wages earned six
months prior to the date of the employer bankruptcy or receivership. Yet the federal Wage
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Earner Protection Program does not provide money to employees whose employers are
still operating or are informally bankrupt or insolvent. In this regard, it is important to note
that only a small fraction of complaints involve situations of formal employer bankruptcy
or insolvency. Of all complaints with monetary claims received by the Ministry of Labour
between 2012/13 and 2014/15, only between 3 and 5 percent per year were related to
employers who were formally bankrupt or insolvent.81 The vast majority of Orders to Pay
are issued to businesses that are still in business or informally insolvent or bankrupt. As
a result, only a small fraction of employee claims are covered by the Wager Earners’
Protection Program (WEPP) and, even when they are, its $4,000 cap on payouts and six
month time limit mean that some eligible employees recoup only a portion of their wages.
Given these limitations, a wage protection fund run by the government of Ontario,
and covering all situations of non-payment not falling under the WEPP, is needed for
employees in the province. Such a fund did exist in Ontario from 1991 to 1995. Under
this program, if the employer did not pay an Order to Pay, the employee was entitled
to receive up to a maximum of $5,000 from the government, and the government
would then attempt to recover money from the employer. Given that the fund used
general revenue, it was heavily criticized as a public subsidy for failing or unscrupulous
businesses,82 and was terminated in 1995. Any future wage earner protection program
should be funded through a payroll tax. This approach has the potential to shift the
burden of wage recovery from workers speciically and the general public to those
industries where non-compliance is more prominent, many of which are encouraging
issuring structures that often foster insolvency among businesses at the bottom of
subcontracting chains.
The creation of a Wage Protection Fund would relieve employees from having to pursue
extraordinary measures in order to secure the payment of what they are owed. However,
in order to ensure to the extent possible that the employer or other responsible parties
pay what they owe, a wide range of recovery mechanisms should be made available
to the administrators of the Wage Protection Fund. The recommendations made in the
Final Report of the Changing Workplaces Review (S.5.8) for creating a statutory charge in
favour of the Director of Employment Standards to secure unpaid remuneration and for
enhancing director liability should be considered irst and foremost as mechanisms to
reimburse the Wage Protection Fund, rather than as instruments that employees would
have to avail themselves of in order secure payment of monetary orders.
The same principle applies to the mechanisms discussed below. That is, if a wage fund
is created, these proposals would be tools available to the administrators of the fund.
However, in the absence of such a fund, these mechanisms would be needed to assist
employees to secure payment of the monies they are owed.

ENHANCE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF WAGES
As indicated above in Section 4 on the need for employer liability in general, the
imposition of liabilities on parties that are not the direct employer would also improve
the recovery of entitlements. Expanded liability promises to be particularly efective
in situations of sub-contracted or issured employment, or in franchised employment,
where liabilities can be imposed up the contracting chain. Currently, both director and
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related employer liability are available under the ESA, but they do not necessarily yield
higher rates of recovery. As discussed above, related employer liability is currently only
available in a limited number of circumstances and certainly does not cover many armslength relationships that typically exist in supply chains. Making joint and several liability
apply to supply chain and contracting-out arrangements, and/or expanding the scope
of employment standards entitlements that directors might be liable for would likely
strengthen recovery.

STRENGTHEN COLLECTIONS MECHANISMS INCLUDING WAGE LIENS
The ESA should include all of the recovery mechanisms available to the government
in other legal contexts, such as the Retail Sales Tax Act. A post-judgment wage lien, of
the order currently included in proposed legislative amendments, is a measure that
would provide the Ministry of Labour or a complainant the ability to place a hold on
an employer’s property until an Order is paid. A post-judgment wage lien would likely
improve the rates of recovery of Orders to Pay. However, in situations where an employer
has hidden assets during the investigation, where an employer’s assets are not easily
identiied, or in situations of bankruptcy, post-judgments are often not efective.83 A few
jurisdictions also allow for pre-judgment wage liens enabling a hold on an employer’s
property before a inal judgment is made.84 The chief beneit of pre-judgment liens
over post-judgment liens is that they prevent employers from disposing or hiding
assets during the time a complaint is being investigated. For example, if the Wisconsin
Department of Workforce Development believes that an employer’s assets are at risk of
being liquidated while a wage complaint is being investigated, it has the ability to ile a
lien against the employer’s property. One study determined that, between 2005 and 2015,
79 of the 98 cases (80%) in which the Department brought suit to enforce the lien resulted
in full or partial payment (a very high percentage given that these were all cases in which
assets were determined to be at risk).85 The mere possibility of a wage lien serves to deter
monetary violations among employers.

INTRODUCE LICENSE DEBARMENT
License debarment is another potentially powerful tool to bring to bear on employers
who have not complied with Orders to Pay. A growing number of jurisdictions in the
United States are implementing this measure to combat monetary violations and to
increase the recovery of judgments. In Jersey City, New Jersey, under the recently
passed Wage Theft Ordinance, the City Department responsible for issuing a business
license (for example the Department of Health and Human Services in the case of a
food service establishment) sends a request to the state’s Department of Labor and
Workforce Development for any wage complaint forms iled against a license applicant.
Businesses with outstanding complaint forms will have 30 days to prove payment, or that
they have appealed the order. Failure to pay will result in business license suspension.
In Cook County, Illinois, an employer found to have engaged in repeated or willful
violation of state and federal wage laws in the past ive years faces a number of penalties.
Such employers are ineligible to contract with Cook County, face business licensure
revocation, are ineligible to receive property tax incentives from the County, and may
be required to pay back previous incentives. When applying for business licenses or tax
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incentives, the applicant must submit an aidavit indicating that they have not violated
federal or state wage-payment laws, including the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, the Illinois Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notiication Act, the Employee Classiication Act, the FLSA, or statutes or regulation of
any state which governs the payment of wages. What is important about these measures
is that they make monetary violations and non-payment of judgments potentially very
costly for employers

INTRODUCE WAGE BONDS
A wage bond is a mechanism that requires businesses to put money into a special fund
as a condition of doing business, so that money is available to cover wage claims. The
introduction of wage bonds would increase the recovery of back wages for employees in
sectors where monetary violations are common.
Such measures have a long history in industries such as construction and agriculture, but
they are increasingly being proposed as a mechanism to combat monetary violations in
other sectors.

EXERCISE GREATER CAUTION WHEN FACILITATING SETTLEMENTS
As noted above, settlements facilitated by an ESO can be problematic in situations
where weaknesses in the formal complaints process, such as long processing times or
poor recovery rates, result in pressure on complainants to settle their complaints so that
they will receive something rather than nothing. Policies of the Ministry of Labour should
require ESOs to exercise greater caution when facilitating settlements to ensure that
complainants are not pressured to accept settlement that are likely to be below what
they are owed. ESOs should also exercise caution when facilitating settlements with
employers that have a record of previous violations and/or in situations where multiple
employees are likely to be afected by the claims included in the complaint being settled.

PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT FOR COMPLAINANTS THROUGHOUT THE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Currently, low-wage employees have few options for obtaining legal support throughout
the settlement process. Complainants need greater access to legal or paralegal
assistance in order avoid making agreements that fall below minimum entitlements.
Complainants who have more support, or who are better informed, or who are stronger
willed and therefore better able to persist in the process may do better in settlements.

8. Penalties
The ESA enforcement system includes a range of penalties for employers demonstrated to have
violated employment standards. Such penalties include Notices of Contravention (NOCs),86 Part I
tickets87 or summonses, and Part III prosecutions under the Provincial Ofences Act (POA). One central
problem underlying Ontario’s employment standards enforcement system is that these tools are only
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available where there is a failure to voluntarily comply or settle a claim. Penalties are not used where
claims are withdrawn due to an employer payout and/or settled via a facilitated or non-facilitated
settlement. Another central problem, and our focus here, is that, even in the instances in which they are
available, penalties are infrequently used.
The overwhelming emphasis of enforcement is on compensating the individual complainant for her
or his loss, rather than using punishment to alter the behavior of employers.88 Yet a growing body of
research on the changing nature of employment points toward the need for meaningful punishment
of violations.89 Former administrator of the Wages and Hours Division of the United States Federal
Department of Labor, David Weil, and others90 demonstrate that in many sectors of the economy
employment relations have been transformed through a process of issuring, which leads businesses to
avoid having responsibility for employees through contracting out, franchising, and the use of extended
supply chains. In this issured context, employment is being pushed into increasingly competitive
environments where employers are under enormous pressure to reduce costs. Since labour costs often
comprise a considerable portion of total costs in these industries, the incentive to violate the law grows,
resulting in a greater propensity to engage in reckless or intentional violations. The low risk of getting
caught, coupled with the general weakness of penalties, mean that unscrupulous employers have little
incentive to refrain from violations.

A. Tickets
The penalties associated with Part I tickets are low. Currently, it is $295 for every violation, with a victim
ine surcharge and an administrative fee bringing the total to $360. Such low dollar values do not provide
enough of a monetary penalty to substantially dis-incentivize non-compliance among many employers.
Their inadequacy is especially evident given that the median total entitlement owed to complainants
across the years from 2008/09 and 2014/15 was $1,109.91 Even with their minor monetary penalty,
tickets are used very infrequently when ticketable violations are detected and recorded. Proactive
workplace inspections carried out between 2013/14 and 2014/15 resulted in ESOs issuing 607 Part I
tickets for 6,408 detected ticketable ofences, or 9.5% of all detected ticketable ofenses (see Table 5).
Among individual complaints investigated between 2013/14 and 2014/15, tickets were used even more
infrequently: 332 tickets were issued from a total of 21,946 detected ticketable ofenses.

Table 5: Use of Tickets in Proactive Inspections and Individual Complaints, by Year92
2013/14

2014/15

Total

3,710

2,770

6,480

346

259

605

9.3%

9.4%

9.3%

11,751

10,196

21,947

122

186

308

1.0%

1.8%

1.4%

PROACTIVE INSPECTIONS
Ticketable Violations
Part I Tickets
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets

INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS
Ticketable Violations
Part I Tickets
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets
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B. Notices of Contravention
The dollar amounts associated with NOCs are also low. The penalty for a irst contravention is $250, for
a second contravention in a three-year period it is $500, and for a third or subsequent contravention in
a three-year period it is $1,000.93 If the contravention afects more than one employee, and is not for a
violation of a posting or record-keeping requirement, the ine is multiplied by the number of employees.
Moreover, the preference among ESOs is to impose lower value NOCs. About three quarters of NOCs are
for the lowest amount, $250.94 In about a quarter of cases, the ine is for more than $250, either because
multiple employees were afected or it was a second or subsequent ofence.95
Like tickets, NOCs are also used very infrequently. As Table 6 illustrates, for proactive inspections
conducted between 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 resulting in 6,539 detected violations, NOCs were
issued only 55 times, in other words, for only 0.8% of violations. NOCs have a similar rate of use during
complaints investigations. Out of 22,547 detected violations, 148 NOCs were issued, only 0.7%.

Table 6: Use of Notices of Contravention during Proactive Inspections and Individual Complaint
investigations, by Year96
2013/14

2014/15

Total

3,742

2,797

6,539

21

34

55

0.6%

1.2%

0.8%

12,071

10,476

22,547

80

68

148

0.7%

0.6%

0.7%

PROACTIVE INSPECTIONS
Total Number of Violations
Notices of Contravention
% of Inspections with Notices of
Contravention

INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS
Total Number of Violations
Notices of Contravention
% of Complaints with Notices of
Contravention

C. Part III Prosecutions
Part III prosecutions carry much heavier penalties. If convicted, employers are liable to be ined up to
$50,000 or imprisoned for up to 12 months. Corporations are liable to be ined up to $100,000 for a irst
ofence, $250,000 for a second ofence, and $500,000 for a third or subsequent ofence. However, Part
III prosecutions are used extremely infrequently and largely where employers or corporate directors
fail to comply with Orders to Pay issued by the Ministry of Labour. Between 2012 and 2014, a total of
34 prosecutions involving 57 employers and directors and 167 charges were launched, resulting in 41
convictions.
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Table 7: Frequency of Prosecutions, by Year97
2012

2013

2014

Total

Prosecutions Launched

9

13

12

34

Prosecutions with Convictions

6

9

5

20

Defendants Charged

14

27

16

57

Defendant Convicted

6

10

5

21

Charges Laid

44

65

58

167

Charges with Convictions

15

18

8

41

PROSECUTIONS

DEFENDANTS

CHARGES

Source: Ontario Ministry of Labour: Prosecution and Conviction Statistics and Legal Services Branch Data

In short, there is a very limited chance that employers engaged in employment standards violations
will face a serious penalty. The low likelihood of meaningful punishment represents a fundamental
weakness in Ontario’s employment standards system.

WHAT WE NEED
INCREASE THE DOLLAR VALUE OF NOCS AND TICKETS
A substantial increase to the dollar value of Tickets and NOCs is necessary to strengthen
employment standards enforcement in Ontario. Currently their dollar values are too low
to represent meaningful penalties that will alter behavior. The low likelihood of detection
and the low cost of either NOCs or tickets provide a substantial incentive for employers
to evade ES. The cost of a ticket is substantially less than the potential savings associated
with not paying employees their legal entitlements over an ongoing period of time.
Current legislative proposals to increase their dollar value are too modest to provide
genuinely deterrent penalties.

INCREASE THE USE OF NOCS AND TICKETS
NOCs should be issued for all conirmed violations of listed ESA provisions. Tickets should
also be used more frequently.

AUGMENT THE USE OF PART III PROSECUTIONS
Part III prosecutions must be used more frequently as part of a broader efort to elevate
the deterrence aspects of enforcement. They should also continue to be widely
publicized to augment their general deterrence efect. The Ministry of Labour may
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consider standardizing thresholds for sending a case to legal services to assess whether
it is feasible for prosecution (i.e., violations involving a minimum amount of money,
afected employees, or re-ofenses).

INTRODUCE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Liquidated damages should be introduced in recognition of how ES violations can impose
severe inancial hardship on employees, who often must resort to credit cards or loans
from friends and family. In the U.S. context, the FLSA allows a court to assess liquidated
damages in the amount equal to the unpaid wages or unpaid overtime pay.98 The New
York State Wage Theft Prevention Act, which took efect in 2011, increased the amount of
liquidated damages available to employees who prevail in pursuing a complaint involving
monetary violations from 25% of the back wages owed to 100% of the back wages owed,
in addition to other civil penalties and interest.99 Treble damages allowing for three times
the amount of actual inancial loss to employees are available to aggrieved employees
in a number of U.S. States.100 Under the District of Columbia’s Wage Theft Prevention
Amendment Act of 2014, employees can be awarded damages that are three times the
back wages owed, in addition to the back wages, so that total restitution is essentially
quadruple damages.101 As well, punitive damages are a common feature in wrongful
dismissal cases in Ontario’s small claims proceedings. Similar measures are necessary in
Ontario’s employment standards enforcement system.

POST NOTICES OF CONTRAVENTIONS, TICKETS, AND PART III
CONVICTIONS THAT CLEARLY IDENTIFY ENTITIES THAT HAVE BEEN
PENALIZED FOR VIOLATING THE ESA

“I really believe with businesses … they are
very concerned about their reputations and
appearances. You have to say that it will be
posted somewhere, information will be known…
If they are somehow exposed that would make
them much more compliant all the time.”
Janet, Oice Worker

Although Ontario now posts Notices of Contravention, Tickets, and Part III Convictions,
in many cases the common name of the employer is obscured, such that it is unclear
to the public which entity has been penalized. Ontario should follow the lead of other
jurisdictions and authorize the Ministry of Labour to post a summary of violations that is
clear and in a place visible to the public. For example, the New York State Wage Theft
Prevention Act allows the state’s Department of Labor to post a notice of violation for
up to 90 days in a public place in the case of employers found to have engaged in
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willful violations of employment standards. Such transparency-based measures have
been adopted successfully in other realms of regulation. For example, public health
inspectorates often post restaurant hygiene grades that warn the public of restaurant
infractions. They are powerful measures because they mobilize the threat of reputational
damage through “naming and shaming”.

WHAT WE DON’T NEED
REPLACEMENT OF PART III PROSECUTIONS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE
MONETARY PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE OLRB
In the Final Report of the Changing Workplace Review, the Special Advisors recommend
the creation of a system of administrative monetary penalties (AMP) under the jurisdiction
of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), which is intended to replace the Part III
prosecution process. This is a bad idea and, for the reasons we elaborate below, would
degrade of the enforcement regime.
The choices we make about law enforcement both relect and shape our views about the
seriousness of the wrongdoing involved. We reserve the criminal law for the most serious
wrongdoing, but it is a matter of political choice as to what acts are deserving of being
treated as crimes. In the 1930s, in the midst of the Great Depression, the Conservative
government of Canada amended the Criminal Code to make the intentional violation of
minimum wages laws a crime. Although the provision was drafted in a manner that made
it practically unenforceable, nevertheless the law relected a judgment that wage theft
was morally reprehensible and thus deserving of being treated as crime. The provision
remained on the books until 1954.
When modern employment standards laws were enacted in the 1960s, violations
were treated as regulatory ofences rather than crimes. However, employers who were
convicted of regulatory ofences could be sentenced to terms of imprisonment, relecting
the seriousness with which lagrant, intentional or repeated violations of the law were
viewed. While imprisonment is relatively rare, there have been occasions in recent years
when judges determined that incarceration was the appropriate response given the
seriousness of the employer’s violation(s).
A move away from regulatory ofence prosecutions to administrative penalties would
signal a further degradation of the seriousness with which we view wage theft and other
ES violations. Not only would we lose the stigmatization that accompanies a prosecution
in court, but a scheme of administrative monetary penalties would remove the possibility
that an employer could be jailed for even the most lagrant violations of the ESA.
In addition to our concern about regulatory degradation, the proposal to create a system
of administrative monetary penalties fails to address the greatest problem with Part
III prosecutions and that is the extreme reluctance to use this deterrence measure.
Under the current law, the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry of Labour, acting as
Crown Attorney, receives recommendations from the Employment Standards Branch
to prosecute but determines whether the prosecution is in the public interest, taking
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into account the likelihood of securing a conviction. The AMP proposal mimics this
structure by requiring the appointment of a designated oicer of the Crown to act as a
Director of Enforcement, with speciic responsibility to determine whether to initiate AMP
proceedings before the OLRB. While the Special Advisors propose criteria that ought to
be considered in determining whether or not it would be in the public interest to pursue
an AMP, there is no recommendation that AMPs should be routinely or normally sought
when those criteria are met. There is no reason to believe that Crown oicers acting
under an AMP scheme would exercise their discretion diferently than they currently do
with regard to Part III prosecutions.
In sum, while a case might be made for creating a system of AMPs in addition to Part III
prosecutions, the proposal to substitute an AMP scheme for Part III prosecutions would
constitute a degradation of the ESA and its enforcement regime, while failing to address
the real problem of under-use of higher level deterrence measures.

9. Strategic and Proactive Enforcement
An increasingly inluential paradigm in labour regulation, strategic enforcement is premised on
the recognition that employment standards enforcement is becoming more challenging for two
related reasons: irst, because of changes in industry structure that create greater distance between
employees and employing entities, such as growing recourse to sub-contracting; and, second,
because, alongside such developments enforcement resources have not kept pace with the expanding
regulatory responsibilities of labour inspectorates.102 In attempt to counter these challenges, strategic
enforcement is designed to maximize enforcement eicacy in this new and more challenging context.
It calls for inspectorates to proactively target irms at the top of industry structures, as it is these irms
whose policies and practices shape workplace practices down the supply chain by sub-contractors,
franchisees, and subsidiary corporations. This approach aims to utilize the monitoring and compliance
mechanisms that are already in place in these organizational arrangements and networks. It calls
for inspectorates to develop a sophisticated understanding of business environments that may be
conducive to labour standards violations, and to practice a kind of “regulatory jujitsu”, which uses
compliance and deterrence measures in a variety of strategic combinations that are responsive to the
context.
The overwhelming share of enforcement resources in Ontario have gone towards supporting a reactive
complaints-based system.103 Reports published by the Oice of the Provincial Auditor General in both
1991 and 2004 found that proactive inspections were severely under-utilized, despite their efectiveness
in detecting ESA violations. However, in recent years, between 2012/13 and 2014/15 speciically, the
number of proactive inspections conducted by the Ministry of Labour has increased. This is a positive
development because such inspections are efective in inding otherwise hidden violations. The
percentage of inspections that detected violations ranged from 75% to 77% in the years between 2011/12
and 2013/14, dropped to 65% in 2014/15, and rose again to 70% in 2015/2016.104
The Ministry of Labour categorizes proactive workplace inspections into several distinct types. The
three that are most commonly used are expanded investigations, targeted or blitz inspections, and
regular inspections. Expanded inspections are triggered by an individual complaint and occur where
an ESO detects a violation that is amongst the eleven standards evaluated in workplace inspections,
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and has reason to believe that other employees are afected. Targeted or blitz inspections are pursued
in sectors identiied at the provincial level, and typically take the form of blitzes directed at a particular
industry, occupational group, or form of employment. In contrast, regular inspections are largely
determined either by individual ESO2s or regional or district oices on the basis of local conditions and
are unconnected with blitzes. In addition to these three main types, the Ministry undertakes and tracks
several other types of inspections, including re-inspections of previous violators, inspections as a result
of participating in a self-assessment (known as a “compliance check”) and inspections prompted by
other ESOs, regional and district program managers, and/or the staf of the Employment Practices
Branch. Because these types of inspections are less common, below they are grouped together with
regular inspections. Of the diferent types of inspections carried out, expanded investigations turn up the
most violations: 82% of such investigations revealed violations between the years 2011/12 to 2014/15.105

Graph 9: Rates of Violation Detection by Type of Inspection, 2011/12 to 2014/15106
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WHAT WE NEED
AUGMENT PROACTIVE INSPECTIONS COUPLED WITH A ROBUST
COMPLAINTS SYSTEM

“When you do a claim with them [the Ministry
of Labour], for example, I hope they go in the
company and resolve that problem. So that it
doesn’t happen to others.”
Eamon, Maintenance Worker, Retail
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Continued investment in proactive enforcement is necessary. But it should not come at
the expense of the complaints intake system. Any reform to the complaint system must
be oriented toward reducing the barriers workers face in raising complaints regardless
of the nature and degree of their grievances. A means of processing complaints that
is consistent with the strategic enforcement paradigm would involve building on the
Ministry of Labour’s high level of success with expanded investigations, and improving
the use of complaints as a resource that can provide information about violations and
inform Ministry of Labour practices. Additionally, special complaints handling measures
could be adopted for complaints that come from employees in industries that are under
represented among the complaints received by the Ministry of Labour, or known to be
industries in which employees experience diiculties exercising voice. Using complaints
in this way is a key plank of the strategic enforcement paradigm.
From this perspective, the recommendation in the Final Report of the Changing
Workplaces Review to weaken the complaint system by permitting the Ministry of
Labour to refuse to investigate complaints and instead direct complainants to take their
complaints directly to the OLRB should be rejected.107 Rather than reducing the barriers
workers face in raising complaints, such a proposal would increase them by shifting the
burden of investigating complaints onto workers’ shoulders and by requiring them to
pursue their claims through an adversarial adjudication system. Vulnerable workers are
least likely to pursue their complaints through such a process.
Moreover, to the extent the recommendation is motivated by a desire to save scarce
resources, the Special Advisors fail to consider the considerable resources that would be
required to shift to an adjudication model. To begin with, the OLRB requires a signiicant
infusion of additional resources to be able to handle the low of complaints, especially
if the specially appointed vice-chairs are also expected to consult with the parties prior
to the hearing as part of the dispute resolution process. If the OLRB is not adequately
resourced, the result would be lengthy delays and undue pressure on complainants to
settle their cases. As well, as the Special Advisors recognize, to be credible the system
would require resources be provided to assist complainants to prepare and present their
case.108 However, with the exception of their recommendation to expand the mandate
and increase funding of the Oice of the Worker Advisor, their recommendations by and
large aim to limit costs by focusing on the provision of on-line assistance and written
explanatory materials, legal charity (lawyers ofering pro bono assistance), or dependence
on worker advocacy groups, legal clinics, and trade unions providing legal assistance
without additional funding for doing so.

CONTINUE PROACTIVE INSPECTIONS OF WORKPLACES WHERE
VIOLATIONS ARE LIKELY
Vulnerable employees in precarious jobs face heightened risks in exercising voice when
faced with violations. Many such employees face the threat of retaliation if they come
forward, especially those with an insecure residency status, thereby reducing their
likelihood to do so. Increased proactive inspections of workplaces where such employees
are concentrated is necessary.
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CEASE PROVIDING ADVANCE NOTICE TO EMPLOYERS OF INSPECTIONS
Providing advance notice109 to an employer for any inspection is not mandated in the ESA.
It is reasonable to assume that advance notice provides a given employer a chance to
hide evidence of violations, and to select which employees will be present and available
for an ESO to speak with on the day of an inspection. This opportunity may thereby
reduce the number of violations identiied during an inspection, or increase the number
of investigations that result in indings of no violation.
In the case of targeted inspections or blitzes, the practice of issuing a public
announcement should however continue. Given evidence of the importance of employer
and worker networks in communicating about the potential for inspection,110 public
notices of industry blitzes may motivate employers in a sector to bring themselves into
compliance, thereby maximizing the beneit of the blitz.

DEVELOP OTHER STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
The development of other strategic enforcement practices that target irms at the top of
industry structures whose policies and practices shape workplace practices down the
supply chain by sub-contractors, franchisees, subsidiary corporations is necessary. This
approach aims to utilize the monitoring and compliance mechanisms that are already in
place in these organizational arrangements and networks.
The “hot goods” provisions of the US FLSA (s. 15(a)(1) and 12(a)) exempliies another
strategic enforcement option. Under these provisions, it is illegal for goods to be shipped
in interstate commerce if they were produced under conditions that violate the overtime
or minimum wage provisions of the Act. With the rise of just-in-time production, the
potential costs imposed on manufacturers through these provisions have increased. For
this reason, in recent years, the US Wages and Hours Division has revived their use and
now enters into monitoring agreements with manufacturers that have faced an embargo
of their goods due to the non-compliance of sub-contractors.111 Enforcement tools
enabling the Ministry of Labour to embargo goods manufactured in violation of the ESA
should similarly be adopted.

10. Closing the Gap: An Agenda for Change
Employment standards are a key source of formal protection for many employees; however, Ontario’s
employment standards are not living up to their founding promise of providing a loor of minimum
terms and conditions of employment – or set of social minima – based on the principles of fairness and
universality, due partly to deiciencies in enforcement. Employment standards and their enforcement
are not keeping up with workplace practices that fuel the spread of precarious employment and that
increase the likelihood of employer non-compliance with the legislation. For too many employees,
employment standards are paper rights not realized in practice. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the
enforcement gap.
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A wide range of practical measures holds much potential to strengthen the enforcement of employment
standards in Ontario. The following is a list of measures, drawn from the proceeding evidence-based
analysis, which would help to improve employment standards and their enforcement in Ontario. These
measures are best pursued as a package. That is, there are links between them – for example, it is
imperative to deal with employer liability alongside pursuing strategic enforcement measures that move
from the bottom to the top of supply chains. Similarly, without applying suiciently deterrent penalties
to those that violate the ESA, the eicacy of improvements to wage recovery regimes will be muted.
Closing the employment standards enforcement gap thereby requires a multi-pronged approach
to bringing minimum standards and their enforcement into sync with the contemporary realities of
Ontario’s labour market.

SCOPE OF COVERAGE OF THE ESA:
¡

Expand the ESA to encompass dependent contractors

¡

Make Misclassiication an Ofence

¡

Introduce a Presumption of Employee Status

EMPLOYER LIABILITY:
¡

Enhance Related Employer Provisions

¡

Expand Joint and Several Liability

EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL RULES:
¡

Eliminate Unprincipled and Unjustiied Exemptions

¡

Establish Strict Criteria for Retaining/Establishing Exemptions and Special Rules

¡

Establish a Process for Retaining/Establishing Exemptions and Special Rules

INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AND REPRISALS:
¡

Allow Anonymous and Third Party Complaints

¡

Eliminate the Employee Contact Requirement

¡

Expedite Reprisal Investigations

¡

Continue ESO Investigation of Individual Complaints

RECOVERY OF WAGES:
¡

Establish a Wage Protection Fund for Ontario

¡

Enhance Joint and Several Liability for Payment of Wages

¡

Introduce Wage Liens and Business License Debarment

¡

Introduce Wage Bonds

¡

Exercise Greater Caution When Facilitating Settlements

¡

Provide More Support for Complainants throughout the Settlement Process
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PENALTIES:
¡

Increase the Dollar Value of NOCs and Tickets

¡

Increase the Use of NOCs and Tickets

¡

Augment the Use of Part III Prosecutions

¡

Introduce Liquidated Damages

¡

Post Notices of Contravention Clearly Identifying the Penalized Employer

¡

Do Not Replace Part III Prosecutions with Administrative Monetary Penalties Imposed by the
OLRB

STRATEGIC AND PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT:
¡

Augment Proactive Inspections Coupled with a Robust Complaints System

¡

Continue Proactive Inspections of Workplaces Where Violations Are Likely

¡

Cease Providing Advance Notice to Employers of Inspections

¡

Develop Other Strategic Enforcement Measures
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APPENDIX 1
List of Partner Organizations
¡

Cavalluzzo Hayes Shilton McIntyre & Cornish

¡

Community Advocacy & Legal Centre (Belleville)

¡

Human Rights Legal Support Centre

¡

Law Commission of Ontario

¡

Legal Assistance of Windsor

¡

Ontario Ministry of Labour

¡

Ontario Public Service Employees Union

¡

Parkdale Community Legal Services

¡

Sudbury Community Legal Clinic

¡

Workers’ Health & Safety Legal Clinic

¡

York University (Lead)

¡

Windsor Workers’ Action Centre

¡

Workers’ Action Centre

¡

Laurentian University

¡

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto

¡

Ryerson University

¡

University of Windsor
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APPENDIX 2
Possible Sectoral Structure for the Review of Exemptions (in alphabetical order)

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

Farm Employees (Other than Harvesting and Horse Breeding and
Boarding)
Fishers
Harvesters of Fruit, Vegetables or Tobacco
Flower Growing
Growing, Transporting and Laying Sod
Growing Trees and Shrubs
Horse Boarding and Breeding
Keeping of Furbearing Mammals
Canning, Processing, Packing or Distribution of Fresh Fruit or
Vegetables (seasonal)
Employees of continuously operating agricultural operations

CONSTRUCTION AND
MAINTENANCE

Road Construction
Sewer and Watermain Construction
Construction Employees (Other than Road Building and Sewer and
Watermain Construction)
Road Maintenance
Sewer and Watermain Maintenance
Maintenance (Other than Maintenance of Roads, Structures Related
to Roads, Parking Lots and Sewers and Watermain)
Road Construction Sites - Work that is not Construction Work
Road Maintenance Sites - Work that is not Maintenance Work
Sewer and Watermain Construction Site Guarding
Employees of continuously operating construction sites

EMERGENCY SERVICES

Ambulance Drivers, Ambulance Driver’s Helper or First-aid
Attendant on an Ambulance
Fireighters
Employees of continuously operating hospitals

HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY

Hospitality Industry Employees (Hotels, restaurants, taverns, etc.)
Liquor servers
Employees of continuously operating hospitality establishments
Hunting and Fishing Guides

MANUFACTURING

Ship Building and Repair
Employees of continuously-operating manufacturing industries

AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE

43

MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS

Chiropodists
Chiropractors
Dentists
Massage Therapists
Naturopaths
Optometrists
Pharmacists
Physicians and Surgeons
Physiotherapists
Psychologists

PERSONAL/RESIDENTIAL
SERVICES

Residential Building Superintendents, Janitors and Caretakers who
reside at place of work
Homecare Employees Who Provide Homemaking or Personal
Support Services
Residential Care Workers
Domestic Workers (Employed by the Householder)
Embalmers and Funeral Directors
Landscape Gardeners
Swimming Pool Installation and Maintenance
Employees of continuously operating residential services (excluding
health care facilities

PROFESSIONAL &
SCIENTIFIC SERVICES

Architects
Engineers
Lawyers
Public Accountants
Surveyors
Teachers
Real Estate Salespersons and Brokers
Information Technology Professionals
Veterinarians
Employees of continuously operating professional/scientiic
oices/facilities

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Municipal Employees
Ontario Government and Government Agency employees

RETAIL SALES

Retail Business Employees
Employees of continuously operating retail businesses
Travelling Salespersons (Commissioned)
Commissioned Automobile Salesperson

STUDENTS

Students-in-training in Professions
Student Employee in Recreational Program Operated by a Charity
Student Employee Providing Instruction or Supervision of Children
Student Employee at Children’s Camp
Student three-hour rule
Student under 18 - minimum wage
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TRANSPORTATION
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Highway Transport Truck Drivers (“For Hire” Businesses)
Local Cartage Drivers and Driver’s Helpers
Public Transit Employees
Taxi Cab Drivers
Employees of continuously operating transportation services
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